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Lawyers faced with government contract controversies can easily
find themselves in a hopeless quandary. If the matter cannot be
settled administratively, the course of judicial review is a unique
and unfamiliar one, with a vast number of pitfalls-pitfalls whose
size and location seem to change with each new decision rendered
by the Court of Claims. This article attempts to exhaustively
chart the pitfalls and the course to be followed for effective hand-
ling of a review. It is an invaluable aid to the practitioner.
T HE CONTROVERSY surrounding judicial review by the
Court of Claims of administrative decisions on government con-
tract disputes has received a substantial amount of treatment in
legal literature.1 The difficult, interesting, and provocative prob-
lems in this area have been extensively discussed, and many solu-
tions to those problems have been proposed.2 While an analysis in
a critical vein constitutes a serious temptation for any writer, that
approach to the subject matter already wears a sufficient number of
coats. This article assumes a more pragmatic cloak; it contents
itself with an up-to-date analysis of what the law is, not what it
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should be, and any prognostications which it may make will be based
on the assumption that serious changes will not be made in the
statutes or administrative procedures involved.
Despite the protestations of the preceding paragraph, however,
a brief background of the area is necessary for the uninformed
reader. While it is said that when the Government enters into
contracts it has rights and responsibilities similar to those of indi-
viduals,3 it should be pointed out that federal government contracts
differ materially from private contracts. For one thing, the pro-
visions of government contracts can hardly be said to emanate from
a "meeting of the minds"; rather, the provisions are wholly dictated
by the Government. "It is well known that anyone seeking a con-
tract with the Government must be willing to agree to accept the
contract drawn by the Government... ."4 Additionally, the ordinary
contract remedies would be intolerable in a government contract:
the technical procedures and delays of litigation might cause eco-
nomic havoc to a contractor whose credit may have been stretched
to the limit in order to undertake the contract; and the Govern-
ment cannot afford delays in completion of the contract. Hence,
the use of some sort of arbitration procedure was inevitable.
Arbitration provisions in government contracts take the form
of a standard "disputes" clause.5 This clause provides that all dis-
' Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 352 (1935).
' Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 522, 530, 339 F.2d 606, 611
(1964), modified, 34 U.S. LAW WEEK 4440 (U.S. June 6, 1966), 1965 DuKE L.J. 654.
For example, the prescribed "disputes" clause for supply contracts, 41 C.F.R. §
1-7.101-12 (1965), reads as follows:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a ques-
tion of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall
be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and
mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of the Con-
tracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless within 30 days from the date of
receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting
Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or
his duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be
final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have
been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any
appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity
to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision
of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance
of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
"(b) This 'Disputes' clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in
connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above. Provided, That nothing
in this contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board on a question of law."
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putes between the parties arising under the contract shall be
decided by a specified government contracting officer, and that his
decision will be final. Almost all government contracts now
allow an appeal from the contracting officer's decision to some sort
of administrative appeals board, but the "disputes" clause ordinarily
states that work on the contract must continue pending such an
appeal. This system of settling disputes is an expeditious one, and
usually works to the advantage of both parties. A dissatisfied con-
tractor may, however, wish to attack an unfavorable decisiorf in
the courts.0 He may bring suit in either the federal district courts
or the Court of Claims,7 and the question which immediately arises
is what type of control a court may then exercise over the con-
troversy.
Resolution of this question has had a long history. The Supreme
Court in 1878 upheld the validity of arbitral clauses which per-
mitted one of the parties in the dispute to resolve it," and in
1950 the Court held that "disputes" clauses providing for finality
of administrative decisions on questions of law precluded judicial
review of such decisions.9 Close on the heels of this case came
Wunderlich v. United States,10 holding that, absent fraud (con-
scious wrongdoing on the part of the government adjudicators),
judicial review was likewise precluded on questions of fact.
In response to the furor caused by this case, Congress took a
hand and liberalized the standards for judicial review of administra-
tive decisions under government contracts by enacting the Wunder-
lich Act. 1 This act permitted judicial attack on fact decisions upon
6 Sovereign immunity was waived for contract claims against the Government by
Tucker Act § 1, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (now codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1246 (a) (2), 1491
(1964)).
7Jurisdiction in the Court of Claims is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). The
District courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear such cases where the amount in-
volved does not exceed $10,000 by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1964).
8 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
' United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
0 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
1168 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964):
"[N]o provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the
finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency
or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question
arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as
limiting judicial review of any such decisions to cases where fraud by such official
or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such de-
cision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or
arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not sup.
ported by substantial evidence."
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allegations that such decisions were (1) fraudulent, (2) arbitrary,
(8) capricious, (4) so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad
faith, or (5) not supported by substantial evidence. The act further
provided that no government contract shall contain a provision mak-
ing final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board.
I
TIE BASIC CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COURT OF CLAIMS
The Court of Claims initially interpreted the Wunderlich Act
as permitting trials de novo in actions to review administrative de-
cisions.12 The circuit courts, on the other hand, were unanimous in
construing the act as limiting judicial review to the administrative
record.13 This conflict was seemingly resolved by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 14 which held that,
except for fraud, judicial review of adverse administrative decisions
falling within the scope of "disputes" clauses had to be tested for
finality under the Wunderlich Act solely on the basis of the ad-
ministrative record.15 The decision went on to say that an inade-
quate administrative record could, in an unusual situation, justify
judgment against the Government, or the action for judicial review
could be stayed or suspended to permit development by the agency
involved of an administrative record which would be adequate for
judicial scrutiny.' 6
The Court of Claims has not passively accepted this rebuff from
the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court of Claims has relentlessly
narrowed the Bianchi decision by a series of distinctions and refine-
ments which, on the one hand, have given the contractor a wide
scope of judicial review, but, on the other hand, present him with
a tortuous path to follow to achieve that review. When a dispute
" . .No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a ques-
tion of law the decisions of any administrative official, representative, or board."12 Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956).
See Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 151 F. Supp. 817, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 877 (1957).
13 See, e.g., Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963); Hoffman v. United States, 276 F.2d 199
(10th Cir. 1960); Lowell 0. West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.
1959); Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959).
1, 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
15Id. at 714.10Id. at 717-18.
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arises, therefore, it is essential for the contractor to move carefully
through the steps necessary to effectuate his claim. These steps will
be traced in the sections that follow.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The first decision to be made by the contractor is what he must
do to obtain relief within the administrative framework. The ordi-
nary course is to seek a final decision from the contracting officer,
and if his decision is unsatisfactory, to appeal to the secretary or
administrative appellate board provided for by the "disputes" clause
of the contract. Failure to so exhaust these administrative remedies
will result in dismissal of any later court action, at least when com-
plete relief would have been available to the contractor under the
terms of the contractY.
However, failure to exhaust administrative remedies has been
held not to bar judicial relief in instances where the appeal pro-
cedure was inadequate or unavailable;18 where a contracting officer
(or his equivalent) has refused or failed to make a decision within
a reasonable time; 19 where confusion and delay in pursuing the ad-
ministrative processes have occurred; 20 where further administrative
proceedings would tend to "eat up the substance" of the claims;2'
or where the contracting officer failed to carry out a decision by
the appellate board in the contractor's favor.22 In general, the con-
tractor must pursue his administrative remedies until he has no
17 United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946); United States v.
Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944). See generally Speidel, supra note 1.
If a contractor mistakenly applies for administrative relief, he is not thereafter
estopped from suing in the Court of Claims for breach of contract. "A claimant is
not restricted to a 'one-shot' or 'sudden death' attempt to obtain relief." Specialty
Assembling & Packing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 554, 571 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
18 E.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. The U.S. Army LST 34, 132 F. Supp. 414, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Southeastern Oil Fla., Inc. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 484-85,
115 F. Supp. 198, 201 (1953).
29 E.g., H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 115, 122, 344 F.2d 352, 357
(1965); Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 189, 196-97, 279 F.2d 498, 503-04
(1960); Maxan Dress Corp. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 434, 441-42, 115 F. Supp. 439,
443-44 (1953).
20E.g., Garod Radio Corp. v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 596, 600, 307 F.2d 945,
947 (1962); Reinking Lumber Co. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 307, 311, 283 F.2d
527, 529 (1960).
21 E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 731, 738, 287 F.2d 577, 580 (1961).
22 E.g., C. J. Langenfelder & Son v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 474, 341 F.2d
600, 604-05 (1965).
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reasonable chance of obtaining relief, for whatever reason; but he
is not required to act where it would be impossible or futile to do so.
If relief could not be granted by the administrative adjudi-
cators-for example, where the claim is for breach of contract or in
some other way does not arise under the contract-then there is no
requirement of exhaustion.23
The attitude of the court toward the exhaustion requirement
is illustrated by Universal Ecsco Corp. v. United States.24 Several
of the contractor's claims in that case were clearly subject to the
exhaustion rule. Nevertheless, the court held that since the plain-
tiff's major claims involved an alleged breach of the contract, "it
would not be just or feasible to separate out this small part and
require it to be heard administratively while the bulk of the case
is tried in this court. 25
B. Techniques During Administrative Proceedings
Because the Wunderlich Act, as interpreted by Bianchi, pro-
vides for finality of administrative findings of fact which pertain
to disputes arising under the contract, the contractor must make as
strong a factual case as possible during the administrative adjudi-
cation.
A problem arises for the contractor, however, when a question
of law is involved which requires certain factual determinations for
its resolution. Should the contractor attempt to establish those
facts before the administrative adjudicators, or may he wait until
he reaches the Court of Claims? The answer to this question has
apparently been given by the Court of Claims in Morrison-Knudsen
Co. v. United States.26 In that case, the legal issue was a matter of
contract interpretation, but complete relief could have been afforded
the contractor under the contract. In view of the inherent com-
plexities of the fact-law distinction and because the administrative
boards frequently must decide questions of law to determine
whether to grant relief, the court held that review should be limited
to the record. This, it was felt, would "tend to improve the quality
of the record" for review.2 7
"3E.g., Commercial Cable Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 813, 822 (1965); Ekco
Prods. Co. v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 75, 84, 312 F-2d 768, 773 (1963); see Compudyne
Corp. v. Maxon Constr. Co., Gov'T CONT. REP. 80231 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1965).
2, 170 Ct. Cl. 809, 345 F.2d 586 (1965).
25 Id. at 813, 345 F.2d at 588.
20 170 Ct. Cl. 757, 345 F.2d 833 (1965).
2711d. at 763, 345 F.2d at 837.
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If the contractor desires any later judicial review to include inde-
pendent fact-finding, he must also be careful not to submit to the ad-
ministrative board factual disputes as within the scope of the "dis-
putes" clause. If he does so, and a substantial amount of time,
trouble, and expense are incurred by the agency in adjudicating
the issue, he may be estopped from denying "that the factual
determinations made by the administrative agency are within
the scope of the 'Disputes' provision .... "2S-even if in reality such
determinations were outside the agency's jurisdiction. The con-
tractor can escape this dilemma by consistently asserting throughout
the administrative proceedings that his claim cannot be conclusively
determined by the agency.29
C. Appeals from Administrative Decisions
The contractor who is dissatisfied with whatever treatment he
has been accorded by the agency may, of course, institute suit in the
Court of Claims. The notion, long entertained by lawyers and ex-
pressed by commentators prior to the passage of the Wunderlich
Act, that only the contractor could "appeal" from an adverse de-
cision has now been rejected by the court. While recognizing the
practical difficulties of doing so as a regular matter of course, the
court has declared in C. J. Langenfelder & Son v. United States30 that
the Government now has a corresponding right to appeal a decision
against it, based on cases wherein administrative decisions favorable
to the contractor were upset when found, upon judicial review, not
to have met the standards set forth in the statute.3 1
III
REVERSALS IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS
How the Court of Claims disposes of a case will depend on a
variety of factors. The court may affirm the agency's decision. If
it reverses, it may be possible to do so without specifically or im-
plicitly overturning some finding or holding of the agency. These
instances will be discussed later in this article.32 More frequently,
2' H. R. Henderson & Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. CI. 228, 245 (1965).
'J 3. G. Watts Constr. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 573, 576 (Ct. C1. 1966). See note
17 supra.
30 169 Ct. C1. 465, 341 F.2d 600 (1965); accord, Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United
States, 847 F.2d 538, 543 (Ct. C1. 1965).
Si 169 Ct. Cl. at 477-78, 341 F.2d at 607-08.
32 See part IV of this article.
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however, it will be necessary for the court to take action in direct
opposition to that of the administrative adjudicators. The methods
by which it can and cannot do so will be discussed below.
A. Cases Squarely Within the Bianchi Holding
The Court of Claims will follow Bianchi where the situation
dictates that it do so. For example, if the judicial review by the
court relates to the fact side of the administrative decision and the
record shows it not to be afflicted with any of the vices set forth
in the Wunderlich Act, the court will affirm.33 This will be true
even in some cases where the agency determination is based on pro-
cedures which are less than desirable.34 The standard rule for
review of an administrative record to determine whether it is suf-
ficient "requires consideration of the materials presented by both
sides, and of cross-examination as well as direct .... A scintilla is
not sufficient, nor is it enough that some pieces of testimony, in
isolation and by themselves, could be said to underpin the finding.135
If these standards are not met, the court will hold that the admin-
istrative findings are not supported by substantial evidence and will
upset them.36
If law questions are involved, or said to be involved, the court
will also often affirm if satisfied that the legal conclusions are sup-
ported by the facts found in the record-that is, if "the facts clearly
indicate no other interpretation could be made." 37
The court does not feel that it is compelled to review the entire
administrative record. In H. R. Henderson & Co. v. United States,3s
the plaintiff proffered only those parts of the record which sup-
ported its position. The Government objected to this procedure,
stating that it believed plaintiff was required to introduce the
entire record; and while the court encouraged the Government to
introduce other parts of the record to support its position, this
33E.g., National Concrete & Foundation Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. CI. 470, 475
(1965); General Bronze Corp. v. United States, 168 Ct. CI. 176, 184, 338 F.2d 117,
122 (1964); T. C. Bateson Constr. Co. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 514, 518 (1960). See
also United States v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 339 F.2d 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 1964).
"Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. United States, 347 F.2d 992, 993-94 & n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
"Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 577, 582 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
30E.g., J. D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235, 246 (Ct. CL. 1965);
Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
37American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 564, 573, 345
F.2d 577, 582 (1965).
38 169 Ct. Cl. 228 (1965).
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offer -was refused.39 In view of the court's position on this matter,
it is likely that the Government will not take this tack again.
B. Waiver of Objection to De Novo Evidence
Post-Bianchi decisions in the Court of Claims have held that
the legal principle of confinement to the administrative record is
procedural or evidential, not jurisdictional. Failure of the Govern-
ment to object to a de novo trial therefore constitutes a waiver. 40
A review of these decisions shows that all of them involve instances
where the Government's failure to object took place before the
Bianchi decision was rendered. 41 It seems unlikely that the Gov-
ernment will again fail to object or will participate in a de novo
trial in a manner construable as a waiver unless satisfied that some
advantage or benefit will thereby accrue to it.
Of course, both the right to object to de novo evidence and the
ability to waive the objection belong to the contractor as well as the
Government. 42 The contractor must be on his guard to prevent
a waiver if he desires review to be limited to the record.48
C. Legal Questions
The Wunderlich Act clearly provides that finality shall not at-
tach to administrative decisions of law. This plunges the court and
the parties before it into the wonderland of the law-fact distinction,
"Id. at 233-35.
40 Construction Serv. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 973 (Ct. Cl. 1966); J. D. Hedin
Con str. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235, 246 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Gardner Dis-
plays Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585, 586 n.* (Ct. Cl. 1965); Acme
Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert.
granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3363 (U.S. April 25, 1966) (No. 1116); Kings Electronics
Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 433, 446, 341 F.2d 632, 640 (1965); Kaiser Indus. Corp.
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 310, 330, 340 F.2d 322, 333 (1965); National Presto Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 749, 755 n.2, 338 F.2d 99, 103 n.2 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 962 (1965); Commerce Int'l Co. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 529, 534-35,
338 F.2d 81, 85 (1964); Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 806, 337
F.2d 861, 862-63 (1963); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 8, 323
F.2d 874, 878 (1963).
,"It is unclear, however, whether this was true in Construction Serv. Co. v. United
States, supra note 40.
"-See Gardner Displays Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585, 586 n.* (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert.
granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3363 (U.S. April 25, 1966) (No. 1116); National Presto Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 749, 755 n.2, 338 F.2d 99, 103 n.2 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 962 (1965).
"The contractor must also beware of the possibility of waiving his right to ad.
mission of de novo evidence. Terminal Constr. Corp. v. United States, Gov'T CONT.
RE. 73059, at 63699 & n.8 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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a land the geography of which it is impossible to chart.44 Indeed,
the Court of Claims frequently admits openly that the distinction
is a knotty one;45 the court recently denominated its decisions in this
area as "foray[s] . . . into the furrowed field of fact-law distinc-
tion .... -41 And it must be admitted in all candor that it is not
beyond the court to adjust the line between fact and law to fit the
needs of the case. 47
The advantage to the contractor of convincing the court that a
question of law rather than of fact is at issue is two-fold: the court
will not be bound by the substantial evidence rule, and de novo
evidence may perhaps be introduced.
Clearly, the two most productive courses open to the contractor
which may lead to the conclusion that an issue is a legal one are to
claim that a breach of the contract is involved or that the question
is one of interpretation of the contract. Both of these courses will
avoid the finality rule; 48 whether they will permit de novo evidence
to be introduced is another matter.
Where the contractor sues for unliquidated damages allegedly
caused by a breach of the contract on the Government's part, the
court has clearly held, in Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United
States, 49 that it may determine the facts de novo, even though the
same facts have already been found by the agency in an earlier ad-
judication under the "disputes" clause.50 The basis for the ma-
jority decision was that the dispute arose outside of the contract and
was one over which neither the contracting officer nor the administra-
tive review agency had jurisdiction.
" See River Constr. Corp. v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 254,262-65 (1962); 4 DAvis, AD-
MINISTRATivE LAW TREATiSE § 30.01 (1958); Schwartz, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action: Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 50 GEo. L.J. 684 (1962); Note, 54 GEo.
L.J. 644, 660-63 (1966); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290, 301-14 (1964).
" "The distinction between factual and legal questions is fraught with many diffi-
culties for the courts, as well as for the administrative boards." Morrison-Knudsen
Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 757, 762, 345 F.2d 833, 837 (1965).
40 Chase & Rice, Inc. v. United States, 354 F.2d 318, 321 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
'7 See text accompanying notes 58-73 infra.
48 E.g., T. F. Scholes, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966); (interpreta-
tion); Tufano Contracting Corp. v. United States, 356 F.2d 535, 538 n.9 (Ct. Cl.
1966) (interpretation); J. G. Watts Constr. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 573,
576 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (breach); Schmid v. United States, 351 F.2d 651, 654 (Ct. CI. 1965)
(interpretation).
4 168 Ct. Cl. 522, 339 F.2d 606 (1964), modified, 34 U.S. LAw WEEK 4440 (U.S.
June 6, 1966), 1965 DUKE L.J. 654.
;0 This holding was recently reaffirmed in J. G. Watts Constr. Co. v. United States,
355 F.2d 573 (Ct. CI. 1966) (by implication).
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Whether de novo evidence would be admitted where the issue
decided administratively involved interpretation of the contract
provisions was reserved in Utah.1 The court sought to answer this
difficult question in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States.52
Recognizing that "there is no one solution of the problem and
that it is impossible to announce a rule that can be applied uni-
formly and without exception in every case in which a related ques-
tion may be presented,"53 the court concluded that where relief is
available under the contract and the dispute is within the jurisdic-
tion of the administrative board "we deem it unwise to base the
right to a trial de novo on the fact-law dichotomy."5 4 Since com-
plete relief was available to the contractor on a claim arising under
the contract and within the scope of the "disputes" clause, "the
action is not one for such a breach of the contract that entitles
either party to a de novo trial on the factual questions decided....
[This is so] even when the major issue to be decided is a question
of law .... 5
The tone of the decision does not appear to sound absolute
and unqualified. It may take an unusual case for the court to grant
an exception but the possibility does not appear to have been com-
pletely foreclosed. Conceivably, a contractor who, for example, is
able to convince the court that lack of compulsory process at the
administrative level prevented him from developing his facts ade-
quately may prevail on a plea for a de novo hearing. Furthermore,
the Morrison-Knudsen decision does not foreclose the court from
choosing from the record those facts it wishes to rely on, or from
taking sub rosa judicial notice of matters not in the record.50
D. Other Methods of Reversing Administrative Decisions
When the administrative board fails to comply with its own pro-
ceduress5 or where procedures dictated by the contract are not
5' 168 Ct. Cl. at 544, 339 F.2d at 619-20 (dissenting opinion). This question had also
been reserved in Wingate Constr. Co. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 131, 139 (1964)
and WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 8-9, 323 F.2d 874, 878 (1963).
52 170 Ct. Cl. 757, 345 F.2d 833 (1965).
3 Id. at 762, 345 F.2d at 836-37.
" Id. at 762, 345 F.2d at 837.
5Id. at 764, 345 F.2d at 837. This holding was recently reaffirmed in Gholson,
Byars & Holmes Constr. Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 987, 989 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
56 See Tufano Contracting Corp. v. United States, 356 F.2d 535, 539 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(court noted trade practice in area).
57 Johnson v. United States, Gov'T CONT. REP. 80115, at 85189 (Ct. Cl. Nov. 12,
1965).
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followed, 8 the court will refuse to attach finality thereto. In addi-
tion, the court has very recently intimated that when administrative
procedures are so substandard that they fail to meet the minimum
due process standards of Morgan v. United States,5 9 this deficiency
will be regarded as vitiating the administrative decision, and a de
novo trial will be held. 0 Where the line will be drawn in this re-
gard must await further development. 61
As a last resort, the court may utilize the inherent flexibility
of the law-fact distinction or the substantial evidence rule.62 A few
examples of this technique will afford adequate illustration.
In Gholson, Byars & Holmes Constr. Co. v. United States,68 the
court stated its function to be "to review the administrative record
before the Board to determine (1) whether its factual determinations
meet the standards of the Wunderlich Act... and (2) whether its
interpretation of the contract specifications is correct. ' 64 Yet the
court then found that "on the basis of the record before it, it must
be concluded that the Board was in error in finding that plaintiff
had failed to sustain its burden of showing the pre-work condition
of the wall and ceiling surfaces." 65 Thus, a clear overruling of a
factual finding of the agency-the pre-work condition of the wall and
ceiling-was accomplished by converting it into a question of law
-whether plaintiff had sustained its burden in showing the condi-
tion. The court therefore held "as a matter of law that plaintiff
is entitled to judgment under the 'Changes' clause of the contract
for the additional expenses incurred in washing ... those ... sur-
faces . . .,,I
In Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States,67 the administrative
board had considered a great amount of factual evidence. The court
blithely stated that
58 Commercial Cable Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 813, 820-22 (1965).
1-298 U.S. 468 (1986), 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
'0Johnson v. United States, Gov'T CONT. REP. 80115, at 85189 (Ct. Cl. Nov. 12,
1965).
"I For an indication of the possible flexibility of such an approach, see 1 DAvis,
ADMINISTmATIVE LAw Ta.ATxisa §§ 7.01-8.20 (1958, Supp. 1965).
" An excellent treatment of this phenomenon can be found in 4 DAvis, ADMIN-
ISTRATIv LAW TRA&TisE §§ 80.01-.14 (1958, Supp. 1965).
351 F.2d 987 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
01 Id. at 989.
05 Id. at 994. (Emphasis added.)
"0 Id. at 1001. (Emphasis added.)
OT 346 F.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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only one aspect of the Board's opinion which is significant to the
resolution of the legal question can be characterized as a deter-
mination of a disputed factual issue, i.e. a symbol for concrete
on. the drawings. To the extent the Board relied on its finding
on that point, its decision is unsupported by substantial evidence
and must be rejected. The other factual findings of the Board
are accepted .... We decide the legal issue on the basis of the
Board's factual findings-except for the one finding, already men-
tioned, which we hold not to be adequately supported .... 08
The court thus chose one finding out of a number of findings,
labeled it and no other as "significant," and "found" it to be "un-
supported."
Often the two major themes illustrated above-law-fact and sub-
stantial evidence-are bound together. Thus, in Kings Electronic
Co. v. United States69 the court faced a problem of whether a cer-
tain contract specification became applicable. If this constituted a
question of law, the court said, "it is sufficient to state our belief
that the Board was incorrect." 70 If this was a question of fact, "we
reach the same result, because the record shows that both parties con-
sidered [the] specification ... to be applicable." 71 Since the board
had found the only relevant specification to be a different one, its
decision "was not based upon substantial evidence" 72-apparently
by definition.
A variation can be found in Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. United
StatesY3 There it was found, through discovery proceedings before
the court, that "erroneous" testimony had been presented to the
agency, and hence " 'we feel certain that if it had the evidence
which we have ... it would have remanded the case to the contract-
ing officer for a decision properly arrived at.' ",74 For this reason,
the court held the agency's findings lacked "'substantial support
in the record as a whole.' "75
This flexibility can work both ways, however. For example, in
Chase & Rice, Inc. v. United States76 the court ostensibly side-
68 Id. at 964.
69 169 Ct. C1. 433, 341 F.2d 632 (1965).
70 Id. at 446, 341 F.2d at 640.
S1 Id. at 446-47, 341 F.2d at 641.
7 2 Ibid.
73 169 Ct. C1. 310, 340 F.2d 322 (1965).
4 Id. at 334, 340 F.2d at 336.
7 Ibid.
7 354 F.2d 318 (Ct. C1. 1965).
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stepped the law-fact distinction by holding that regardless of whether
a question of law or fact was involved, "this court in applying the
most liberal or most stringent standard of review is in agreement
with the Board's decision." 7 Where the court agrees with* the
agency, the subtle distinctions of law-fact and substantial evidence
become meaningless.
IV
MISSING FACTS AND REMAND PRACTICES
If determinations essential to a decision by the Court of Claims
are missing from the administrative record, the possibility of re-
manding the case arises. The Court of Claims has a strong bias in
favor of expediting litigation;78 hence, it is understandable that the
court-in spite of the language in Bianchi which seems to favor
relitigation at the administrative level1 9-has evolved rules which
keep remands to the administrative agencies at a minimum.
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the court never re-
mands cases; rather, instances of remand are simply hard to find
since they apparently occur through routine intermediary orders.
For example, two recent administrative- decisions reveal that re-
mands from the Court of Claims had occurred, in one instance for
the purpose of conducting additional hearings with respect to cer-
tain reports considered by the board in arriving at its decision,8 0
and in the other to pursue and complete the administrative remedy
on an issue created by an amended administrative decision issued
after commencement of suit in the Court of Claims.81
When the record is deficient in some respects but nevertheless
contains sufficient information for the court to render a decision
on the specific questions in issue, no remand will be ordered.8 2
The court has intimated, however, that it might remand a case even
under these circumstances if credibility of witnesses could have a
bearing on the decision.8 3
77Id. at 321. Cf. Terminal Constr. Corp. v. United States, Gov'T CONT. REP.
73059, at 63698 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
78 For the reasons underlying this tendency, see Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 808-09, 337 F.2d 861, 863-64 (1963).
70 See text accompanying note 14 supra and notes 85-86 infra.
80J. L. Simmons Co., 65-2 Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 5266.
81 Loral Electronics Corp., ASBCA No. 9174 (administrative proceedings on remand
pending).
8 E.g., C. J. Langenfelder & Son v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 476, 341 F.2d 60Q,
606 (1965).
83 Gholson, Byars & Holmes Constr. Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 987, 995 n.7
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As has been pointed out previously, there are a number of
situations in which the court has held that the contractor need
not exhaust his administrative remedies before suing in the Court
of Claims. 4 In such a situation, since no record will exist for re-
view, a necessary concomitant rule is that the court will determine
the facts itself without a remand. 5
When the court reverses an administrative decision, which in
turn creates a need to determine the amount of damages, the cases
clearly and uniformly hold that remand for that purpose will not
be ordered, but that such determination will be made by the court
itself."6
A difficult situation occurs when the administrative adjudicators
reject the plaintiff's claim on some threshold ground-such as lack of
jurisdiction-and suit is then brought in the Court of Claims. Since
the agency will not have reached any of the substantive issues,
no record will exist for the court's review. In Anthony Grace &
Sons v. United States" the court clearly decided that it should not
remand for factual findings in such a case. This holding was justi-
fied on the ground that a remand would not expedite the litigation,
a goal contemplated even in Bianchi.88
Similarly, the Court of Claims did not remand but approved a
de novo trial in a recent case where the administrative record was
so deficient that it could not be properly reviewed. The Supreme
Court in Bianchi, it will be recalled, had declared in a situation of
this kind that two courses could be followed: The reviewing court
could grant judgment without further administrative action, or it
could stay its own proceedings pending further action before the
(Ct. C1. 1965): "Suspension of the case to afford the Board opportunity to make findings
on the issue would not serve any useful purpose inasmuch as the record was wholly
documentary and the Board would thus not be in any special position to judge
credibility." This passage is followed, however, by an alternative rationale: "Sus-
pension, moreover, would delay still further a controversy that has already been the
subject of inordinate delay."
"See part II A of this article.
"E.g., H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 115, 122, 344 F.2d 352, 356-57
(1965).
"" E.g., Aircraft Associates & Mfg. Go. v. United States, 357 F.2d 373, 380 (Ct. Cl.
1966). Schmid v. United States, 351 F.2d 651, 655 (Ct. C1. 1965); C. J. Langenfelder
& Son v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 465, 486, 341 F.2d 600, 612 (1965); E. H. Sales,
Inc. v. United States, 169 Ct. CI. 269, 275, 340 F.2d 358, 361-62 (1965).
"7 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 345 F.2d 808, rev'd, 34 U.S. LAw WEEK 4437 (U.S. June 6, 1966).
88 Id. at 694-95, 345 F.2d at 812-13. Judge Davis dissented to the majority's use of
Bianchi for support of this holding. See id. at 709-10, 345 F.2d at 821-22 (dissenting
in part).
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agency involved.8 9 And in any case in which the department failed
to remedy the particular substantive or procedural defect or in-
adequacy, the sanction of judgment for the contractor, said the
Supreme Court, would always be available. 90 The Court of Claims
apparently did not consider these views of the Supreme Court as
directory. In Roberts v. United States,91 the Secretary of the Smith-
sonian Institution appointed a special board to hear the dispute and
make recommendations to him. The administrative proceedings
were found to involve the following deficiencies: The record was
such that the court could not determine what evidence outside of the
record the board considered in preparing its report and recommen-
dations; the failure of the board to provide for a transcript of the
testimony made it impossible to ascertain the precise quantum
of evidence which led the board to its conclusion; the refusal of
the agency to furnish the contractor with a copy of its report and
recommendations to the secretary until the Court of Claims action
was started was improper; and there was a lack of quasi-judicial de-
tachment and impartiality occasioned by the fact that the person
who made the decision appealed from was also the contracting of-
ficer.9 2 These defects and improprieties led the Court of Claims
to conclude that the administrative procedure was so deficient tech-
nically that the Wunderlich Act was not applicable, and the case
was not remanded to the agency for corrective action. Instead,
the Court of Claims held that the trial commissioner properly
admitted de novo evidence.9 3 This retention of the case comports
with earlier decisions of the Court of Claims to the effect that,
without countervailing advantages, remands frequently would only
add to the delay which the Supreme Court sought to diminish
through its ruling.9
The remand practices of the Court of Claims are perhaps the
most controversial aspect of its activity in this area. While the writer
promised earlier not to become an advocate in this article, there is
nevertheless a practical reason to support court retention which
so United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 378 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1968).
0 Id. at 718.
91357 U.S. 938 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
021d. at 944.
03 Ibid.




should be mentioned here, principally because it does not seem to
have been considered or urged by others.
Some of the "disputes" clauses found in Navy and Corps of
Engineers contracts provide for intermediary administrative ap-
peals.95 If a case involving such intermediary appeal requirements
were ultimately reversed by the court and had to be returned for
additional administrative proceedings, to which administrative level
should remand be made? And who would answer this question?
The court has no power to order remands,9 6 and even if its wishes
would be followed, it may not be familiar enough with the admin-
istrative system of adjudication to know which level could best
rectify the deficiencies. Furthermore, it is not difficult to conceive
that a contractor-after completing his first round of administrative
remedies which resulted in judicial reversal on the merits-would
have to pursue his administrative remedies through several levels
all over again and then still be dissatisfied with the second result.
This, in turn, would require him to sue again under the Wunderlich
Act to right this grievance. In an area already so complex, any policy




The Wunderlich Act unfortunately failed to shed any light
on the operation of an applicable statute of limitations. This area
is, therefore, still fraught with great uncertainty.
When suit is brought after the statutory period appears to have
run, the contractor may make three arguments. First, he can con-
tend that the cause of action did not accrue until the Government
assumed a position contrary to his claim. This contention will prob-
ably not be upheld. "The rule that a claim based on a contract...
first accrues . . . 'when it can be definitely ascertained and set up,
when all that is required of him by the terms of the contract has been
fulfilled by the contractor,' is too well established to now attempt
to controvert."97
"Authority for such procedures can be found in 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-12, 7.203-12
(1965).
"' See United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 717 (1963); Anthony
Grace & Sons v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 695, 345 F.2d 808, 812, rev'd, 34 U.S.
LAW WEEK 4437 (U.S. June 6, 1966).
'7 Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 627, 630 (Ct. CI. 1966).
[Vol. 1966: 372
TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
Secondly, the contractor can argue that the cause of action
does not accrue until administrative procedures have been ex-
hausted, for until that time he has no perfected claim. While this
argument seems somewhat persuasive-at least where the dispute
turns on questions of fact-it has been expressly rejected by the Su-
preme Court9s and will probably be unsuccessful for the reasons
given in the preceding paragraph.
Thirdly, a claim can be made that the statute is tolled during
pursuit of any applicable administrative remedies. This contention
was successful in the recent case of Northern Metal Co. v. United
States,9 but the Third Circuit was careful to point out that the
statute would not be tolled during any period of delay by the con-
tractor in pursuing his administrative remedies-only during actual
pendency before the contracting officer or the appellate board would
tolling occur. 00 In addition, the Court of Claims has recently affirmed
that "it is only when pursuance of administrative remedies is a pre-
requisite to suit that the statute of limitations is suspended or tolled
by such pursuance."''1 1 Presumably this would mean that whenever
plaintiff's suit was for breach of contract, the statute would not be
tolled.
In all cases of doubt, the safe practice for the contractor to fol-
low is to file a "protective lawsuit" while concurrently pursuing
the administrative remedies. 0 2
VI
ADDITIONAL HOLDINGS BY THE SUPREME COURT
While this article was being written, the Supreme Court handed
down decisions in two cases previously discussed-Utah Constr. &
Mining Co. v. United States'03 and Anthony Grace & Sons v. United
States.' 04
The Supreme Court appears to favor the idea that fact determina-
tion functions under "disputes" clauses properly fall within ad-
's McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951).'
"350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965).
100 Id. at 839.
101 Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 627, 631 (Ct. C1.
1966).
02 States Marine Corp. v. United States, 283 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1960); John
P. Moriarty, Inc. v. United States, 97 Ct. C1. 338, 340-41 (1942).
103 168 Ct. C1. 522, 339 F.2d 606 (1964), modified, 34 U.S. LAW WEEK 4440 (U.S.
June 6, 1966), 1965 DuKE L.J. 654.
104 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 345 F.2d 808, rev'd, 34 U.S. LAw Wam 4437 (U.S. June 6, 1966).
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ministrative competence and that duplication of evidentiary hearings
should be avoided. As anticipated, the Utah case was modified
so as to make administratively-determined facts that are relevant and
appropriate in a controversy arising under the contract and within the
scope of the "disputes" clause fully binding even in a controversy
arising outside the contract-at least to the extent that such findings
are directly applicable to the outside controversy. In order to be
conclusive, however, such findings will still have to meet the
criteria of the Wunderlich Act. In addition, to the extent that any
issues could be labeled as being outside of the contract and "dis-
putes" clause, and involving facts which have not been passed upon
administratively, it would seem to follow that a court having juris-
diction could take evidence and decide all factual disputes itself.105
The Grace case was not remanded because the Court of Claims,
in effect, equated the dismissal for untimeliness with decisions which
held that failure of a contracting officer or contract appeals board to
act administratively allowed immediate recourse to the courts. 0
There was considerable doubt as to whether the Supreme Court
would accept this analogy. It was rather more likely for the Supreme
Court, in accordance with the Grace dissent,107 to rule that an er-
roneous dismissal by an administrative agency is not equivalent to a
refusal to consider the merits and, therefore, that courts should re-
mand these cases to the administrative agencies to pass upon the dis-
putes in the first instance. As Grace was reversed, it will cast a shadow
on the propriety of other Court of Claims decisions referred to in this
article which followed the course of retention rather than remand.
One thing is certain. The Court of Claims has shown itself to be
a strong and independent court. The gradual demise of influence
-except for its strict holding-of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bianchi is a clear indication of the future fate of recent Supreme
Court holdings in Utah and Grace which impose limitations that
105 By way of illustration, see Universal Transistor Prods. Corp. v. United States,
214 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). After an adverse administrative decision on an
appeal seeking relief from the imposition of reprocurement costs incident to a termina-
tion of the contract for default, the contractor brought suit for rescission of the
contract on the ground that the Government failed to notify it of the "ruinously
low bid" it had submitted. In denying a motion to dismiss, the court set the case
down for trial, stating that "in the present posture of this case, the Court has power
to and must determine de novo this question of rescission." Id. at 488.
106 Anthony Grace & Sons v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 688, 692-95, 345 F.2d 808,
810-12, rev'd, 34 U.S. LAw WE.EK 4437 (U.S. June 6, 1966).
107 Id, at 709-12, 345 F.2d at 821-23 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
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would hamper judicial review by the Court of Claims at the
operating level. Realizing this, a contractor should not fail to
utilize the full panoply of review opened to him by the Court of
Claims. Whether this broad scope of review is wise or unwise is im-
material. Its existence can hardly be doubted.
